There are several reasons to reflect on the importance of peer disagreements beyond their intrinsic appeal. First, taking into account idealized cases of peer-to-peer dissent helps to isolate the epistemic importance of the disagreement itself. By controlling for other epistemic factors, cases of disagreement between peers help us focus on the epistemic effects of differences of opinion. While, in non-idealized cases, this is only a determining factor in what to believe, the debate about peer differences of opinion tries to help us better understand this one factor. Second, while peers can be quite rare, as we noted above, it is often not clear which party is in a better epistemic position. For example, while it is quite rare for two individuals to have exactly the same weight, it can often be difficult to know which person weighs the most. These unknown cases may have the same epistemetic significance as peer cases. If there needs to be a positive reason to favor one`s point of view, as opposed to positive reasons, to think that the other is a peer, then unknown cases should be treated as peer cases. The question of better position is often not very easy to answer. For most cases of disagreement, if (X ) realizes that she does not agree with (Y ), (X) will not have much evidence that (Y) is her peer, supervisor or inferior when it comes to judging correctly (B ).
For example, when I talk to a neighbour about whether our property taxes will go up next year and I find out that she does not agree with me, I may not have very little idea of how we measure ourselves by the factors of disagreement. I may know that I have more raw intelligence than she does, but I probably have no idea what she knows about local politics, what she thought about it, etc. I will have little basis to think that I am his superior, superior or peer. We can call these cases unknown. So, if you find that you disagree with someone on (B), you don`t need to think or have reason to think that she is your peer, supervisor, or inferior to judge (B). Steadfast View was also motivated by the refusal of equal weight. If your colleague`s opinion on (P) doesn`t matter as much as your own opinion, you may not need to doxical conciliation. While most people think it`s not plausible that your own opinion can count more simply because it`s yours, a closer and more plausible defense has just appealed to you for self-confidence.
Enoch (2010), Foley (2001), Pasnau (2015), Schafer (2015), Wedgwood (2007; 2010) and Zagzebski (2012) launched a call for self-confidence to respond to disagreements between peers. Foley emphasizes the essential and indispensable role of the first personal thought. Applying to cases of disagreement, Foley states: «I have the right to make conflict the competences, procedures and opinions in which I rely, even if those skills, procedures and opinions are precisely those that are questioned by others» (2001, 79). Similarly, Wedgwood argues that it is rational to have some kind of egocentric bias – a fundamental confidence in one`s own abilities and mental states. From this point of view, peer differences of opinion have a kind of symmetry from the point of view of the third person, but none of the parties takes this perspective. . . .